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Two key measures of the responsiveness of the unemployment 
insurance (UI) system to the needs of the labor force are the percentage 
of the labor force that is covered under the UI program and the percent 
age of the unemployed who actually receive UI benefits. Although 
these two indicators are inextricably linked, they have consistently 
moved in different directions since the inception of the UI system (fig 
ure 2.1).
With regard to coverage, the percentage of the labor force that is 
covered under the system has been rising over time, generally as a 
result of changes in federal law. By this measure, the system appears to 
have become responsive to the needs of an increasing portion of the 
labor force. Simultaneously, however, the percentage of the unem 
ployed who actually receive UI benefits has been in decline since data 
first became available in 1947. In part, this long-term decrease can be 
attributed to broad external trends, including those in the demographic 
and industrial composition of the labor force. In addition, there is some 
evidence that changes in federal and state UI laws have made it more 
difficult to qualify for benefits. Regardless of its exact causes, the 
decline in recipiency suggests that the UI system has become less 
responsive to the needs of workers. Thus, the two trends in system 
responsiveness appear to have partially canceled out one another.
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Figure 2.1 Percentage of Workers Who Are Covered and Percentage of Unemployed Workers Who Receive UI 
Benefits, 1950-1993






SOURCE- U.S. Department of Labor.
NOTE: Shaded regions represent recessions from peak to trough.
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The percentage of the labor force that is covered under the UI sys 
tem is defined as the percentage of jobs in which an employer pays UI 
taxes on a portion of a worker's wages. An employer who is required to 
pay UI taxes must pay taxes for all employees. Thus, whether or not a 
worker is covered under the UI system is fully dependent on the partic 
ular status of the worker's employer(s).
Over time, federal coverage requirements have been extended so 
that the vast majority of employers are required to pay UI taxes, result 
ing in coverage for the vast majority of employees. If a worker who is 
covered becomes involuntarily unemployed, that worker can receive UI 
benefits if all state monetary and nonmonetary eligibility requirements 
are met. Coverage may thus be considered a precondition for eligibil 
ity, as workers who are not covered cannot be eligible to receive bene 
fits, even if they meet all eligibility requirements.
Eligibility among those unemployed workers who are covered under 
state UI systems is based on a combination of factors. Monetary eligi 
bility requirements are designed to ensure that those who receive UI 
benefits had a substantial attachment to the labor force prior to their 
unemployment. Only covered wages are considered in making a deter 
mination of monetary eligibility. Thus, if an individual has two jobs, 
and only one of the jobs is covered under UI, then only the wages from 
the covered job are considered in determining eligibility (and in deter 
mining benefit levels).
Nonmonetary requirements are designed generally to ensure that a 
UI recipient (1) is involuntarily unemployed (i.e., was laid off from 
work) or voluntarily left work for good cause, (2) is available for work, 
and (3) is actively seeking work. The first of these conditions (along 
with monetary eligibility requirements) determines whether an unem 
ployed worker initially qualifies for benefits. The second and third of 
these conditions must be satisfied on a continuing basis throughout an 
unemployment spell. If they are not satisfied in any given week, the 
worker is ineligible to receive benefits for that week. In this chapter, 
eligibility is discussed primarily in regard to its effects on recipiency 
among the unemployed.
The receipt of UI benefits by an unemployed worker (the percentage 
of unemployed workers who receive benefits is often referred to as the 
"recipiency" rate) requires that the worker be covered under the UI 
system, make a claim for benefits, and be found to have met all eligibil-
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ity requirements. Thus, an individual's receipt of benefits is a function 
of a combination of three general factors: coverage provisions, an indi 
vidual's decision to apply for benefits, and state eligibility standards. 
Similarly, the percentage of all unemployed individuals who actually 
receive benefits is a function of these factors.
Coverage
Original Coverage Provisions
At the inception of the UI system in 1935, federal law required only 
employers in industry or commerce to be subject to UI taxes, and then 
only if they employed eight or more workers during at least 20 weeks 
of the year. Among the effects of the initial federal provisions were the 
exclusion from coverage of workers in small firms, workers in agricul 
ture and the public sector, and seasonal workers. 1
Blaustein suggests that the decision to limit initial coverage was pri 
marily a practical one, in that it would allow the administrative burden 
to be lessened in the first years of the program, while still ensuring that 
a significant percentage of workers would be covered. He suggests that 
there was always an expectation that coverage would be extended— 
ultimately to all workers who could be subject to involuntary unem 
ployment (Blaustein 1985). Others, however, have provided different 
reasons for some of the coverage exclusions; in particular, they argue 
that the decision to exclude agricultural labor from coverage was 
rooted in discrimination and racism (see Norton and Linder 1996).
Expansion of Coverage
Federal law has been amended on a number of occasions to extend 
coverage to various groups that were excluded under the original law. 
It should be noted that most expansions of coverage were preceded by 
significant opposition and by dire predictions of the harmful effects 
that would result. Rarely have these objections had substantial merit 
(Blaustein 1985).
Coverage was first expanded in 1954, when federal law was 
changed to extend coverage to all commercial or industrial employers
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with four or more workers. In 1970, the law was amended again, 
requiring employers to pay UI taxes if they employ one or more work 
ers during at least 20 weeks of the year or at a payroll of at least $1,500 
in any calendar quarter.
The 1970 UI amendments also extended coverage to employees of 
nonprofit organizations who employ four or more workers. 2 Through a 
combination of the 1970 and 1976 UI amendments, coverage was fur 
ther extended to all employees of state and local governments. 3 In addi 
tion, the 1976 amendments included new coverage for some 
agricultural workers. Employers with ten or more agricultural workers 
in at least 20 weeks of the year or with a payroll of at least $20,000 in 
any calendar quarter were required to pay UI taxes.4
A number of other smaller extensions in coverage have occurred 
since the creation of the UI program. Federal civilian employees were 
included in the system in 1954, when a separate program was created 
to cover them. Former members of the military were added under vari 
ous pieces of legislation in the 1950s, with a separate program also cre 
ated for them.5 Puerto Rico entered the system as a "state" in 1960, and 
the Virgin Islands were included under the 1976 amendments.
Overall, as a result of the extensions of coverage since the beginning 
of the program, UI coverage today is nearly universal. It extends to 
more than 90 percent of all civilian employment in the United States, 
and almost all wage and salaried employees are covered. Only four sig 
nificant coverage exceptions remain.
Remaining Exclusions from Coverage and Effects
First, agricultural workers who are employed on farms that are 
defined as "small" are not covered in many states. Second, workers 
who are classified as "self-employed" are also excluded from coverage. 
Ambiguities in this definition, however, have caused certain workers— 
who should be covered under some other coverage requirement—to be 
excluded from coverage because they are classified as self-employed 
independent contractors. Third, household workers of employers who 
pay wages less than $1,000 per quarter are excluded from coverage, 
and, fourth, employees of religious organizations are excluded. Each of 
these four categories will be discussed briefly.
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Agricultural Workers
A large percentage of agricultural workers remain uncovered by the 
UI system as a result of the "small farm" exclusion, which exempts 
small farm employers from coverage requirements. This is the most 
significant remaining gap in the coverage of wage or salaried workers. 
The exemption of small farm employers from paying UI taxes can 
affect even those migrant workers who do a significant amount of their 
work on large farms. Because their wages from small farm work are 
uncovered, it is possible that the inclusion of only their large farm 
wages (i.e., the covered wages) in determining monetary eligibility 
may result in the workers' failing to meet monetary requirements, even 
if their total wages would have made them eligible. Reasons cited for 
the small farm exclusion include the poor economic position of small 
farmers, as well as practical problems related to difficulties in covering 
workers who, by the nature of their work, are likely to have many dif 
ferent employers or who include a relatively large percentage of 
undocumented aliens. 6
The problems associated with agricultural coverage have been exac 
erbated by the inclusion of a special Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
(FUTA) rule allowing agricultural workers who are supplied by a farm 
labor contractor (or "crew leader") to be considered as employees of 
the crew leader under certain circumstances. The practical effect of this 
rule in many cases has been to assign UI reporting and taxpaying 
responsibilities to crew leaders, among whom worker advocates report 
widespread noncompliance. Thus, even among those agricultural 
workers who should be covered under existing requirements, the crew 
leader provision frequently creates problems for workers who attempt 
to secure those benefits. Further exacerbating the extent of these prob 
lems, the use of crew leaders has increased significantly in recent years 
(Martin 1994).
Blaustein (1985, p. 22) notes that "the trend in the organization of 
agricultural activity has continued in the direction of consolidation of 
farms and large-scale commercial enterprises. This process both calls 
for and makes possible investment in more productive methods and 
equipment that raises output with less labor or with more efficient use 
of labor. As farming increasingly resembles other business activities,
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the grounds for exclusion of farm employers from coverage grow nar 
rower and weaker."
It should also be noted that eight states have expanded their agricul 
tural coverage provisions beyond the federal requirements of the 1976 
UI amendments. A large percentage of the nation's farm workers reside 
in these eight states, which include the major farm labor states of Cali 
fornia, Florida, and Texas. California covers agricultural workers on 
the same basis as workers in all other industries, resulting in almost 
universal coverage of farm workers in that state. In California, agricul 
ture is a negative reserve industry, meaning that unemployed workers 
in agriculture receive more in benefits than agricultural employers con 
tribute to the system. Between 1983 and 1992, agricultural employers 
paid an average of $114 million in UI taxes, while unemployed agricul 
tural workers received an average of $259 million in benefits (Martin 
1994).
Because a relatively large percentage of workers on small farms are 
already covered under state law, the cost of a federal extension of cov 
erage to agricultural workers on the same basis as other workers would 
be relatively small. Rough approximations suggest that additional ben 
efit costs could be between 1 and 2 percent of current total UI benefits 
paid. 7
Self-Employed Workers
Generally, considerations related to moral hazard are cited as the 
primary explanation for the continuing exclusion of the self-employed 
from UI coverage in most states. In particular, coverage is considered 
to be infeasible because of difficulties in determining whether unem 
ployment is involuntary, in identifying what income has been lost, and 
in determining whether or not a self-employed worker is employed or 
unemployed in a given week (U.S. Department of Labor 1995). Each 
of these concerns reflects the moral hazard inherent in any effort to 
provide insurance against unemployment to workers who control 
whether or not they are employed in any given week and who also con 
trol the documentation of this unemployment. Haber and Murray 
(1966, p. 147) suggest that these difficulties make it "obvious" that the 
self-employed cannot be covered in the UI program.
Indeed, only one state—California—allows self-employed workers 
to apply for any sort of self-coverage under the UI program. Under this
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provision, self-employed workers who become unemployed can 
receive UI benefits on a fully reimbursable basis, meaning that they 
must pay back all benefits received, dollar for dollar, after returning to 
employment status. Program administrators report that the use of the 
program is extremely limited. 8 Thus, California, in effect, confronted 
the moral hazard problem by ensuring that workers cannot profit by 
manipulating the system. It is likely that a strict program such as Cali 
fornia's is the only means through which coverage could be extended 
to self-employed workers without significant moral hazard.
While the exclusion of truly self-employed workers from coverage 
may appear to be reasonable—assuming the occurrence of the various 
administrative difficulties that could develop as a result of their cover 
age—there are a number of troubling issues that result from the exclu 
sion of such workers. Most significantly, the actual classification of 
workers as self-employed has created numerous problems. There are 
incentives for employers to attempt to categorize workers as self- 
employed independent contractors.
Indeed, a phenomenon has developed, relating to the emergence of 
new groups of workers who are incorrectly excluded from UI coverage 
by virtue of their classification as independent contractors. It should be 
recognized that this phenomenon has been driven primarily by forces 
external to UI; however, the development has had a direct impact on 
the UI system, both by excluding workers who should be covered and 
by denying the system revenues from UI taxes that should have been 
paid but were not.
For federal tax purposes (including those of FUTA), employment 
classification is based on a set of twenty common law factors. These 
factors are determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and are 
designed to determine "control" in a work relationship, which is criti 
cal in differentiating between those who are employees and those who 
are truly self-employed. For state tax purposes, many states use a 
broader definition of employee than the federal common law test.
Under this system of classification, a significant number of workers 
are misclassified under the IRS system as independent contractors, 
which has important implications for the UI system. Estimates suggest 
that over 4 million workers are misclassified annually, and this is pro 
jected to increase to 5 million workers in the next ten years (Coopers 
and Lybrand 1994). In 1984, the IRS estimated that one of seven
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employers misclassified workers as independent contractors (IRS 
1989). Misclassification of workers appears to be more pronounced in 
certain industries, including construction and finance, insurance, and 
real estate. Firms with fewer than 100 workers were also more likely to 
misclassify employees as independent contractors.
Some of this misclassification is certainly unintentional and may 
result from the ambiguous system of defining employment relation 
ships. Other misclassifications, however, are certainly intentional, as 
employers can avoid payment of payroll taxes (employers avoid social 
security taxes in addition to state and federal UI taxes), as well as some 
employee benefits and other costs associated with compliance with the 
law. Employers who misclassify employees are able to cut costs and to 
gain a competitive edge over other firms that comply with classifica 
tion laws. As a result, workers who should be included in the UI sys 
tem are unable to draw benefits if they should become involuntarily 
unemployed.
Household Workers
Household workers of employers who pay less than $1,000 per 
quarter in wages are not covered under the UI program. Opposition to 
the coverage of these workers centers on administrative obstacles. In 
particular, difficulties in enforcing tax collection and wage reporting 
requirements have been cited as arguments against the extension of 
coverage (e.g., Haber and Murray 1966; Blaustein 1993). Recent pub 
licity has highlighted similar problems in enforcing social security tax 
provisions for household workers. Administrative difficulties in enforc 
ing the work search requirement for unemployed household workers 
have also been cited as an obstacle to providing full coverage to house 
hold workers. The existing coverage of workers in households that pay 
more than $1,000 per quarter, however, appears to nullify this concern. 
More generally, the experience of some states that have provided 
broader coverage for household workers for decades suggests that 
administrative obstacles to coverage can be overcome (Blaustein 
1985).
Employees of Religious Organizations
Workers who are employed by religious organizations are excluded 
from coverage. In general, it appears that this exclusion reflects both
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the desire to maintain the general tax exemption for religious organiza 
tions as well as concern about the constitutional mandate to separate 
church and state.
Coverage Policy Issues
Overall, the extension of UI coverage to the vast majority of wage 
and salaried workers represents a significant success for the UI pro 
gram. Nevertheless, as Blaustein notes, "the coverage issue in unem 
ployment insurance has dwindled to minor proportions overall. 
Perhaps because that is so, it is difficult to overcome the tendency 
toward indifference and neglect about closing the gaps further. For 
those who are excluded, coverage is important. To provide more com 
plete coverage does not appear to face any obstacles more serious than 
apathy. It should be done" (Blaustein 1985, p. 30).
While most workers who face a risk of involuntary unemployment 
are covered under the UI system, those workers who remain uncovered 
are found disproportionately at the low end of the wage distribution 
and often work in jobs for which there is a significant risk of unem 
ployment. Many are workers who have a substantial attachment to the 
labor force and are workers for whom UI benefits would represent a 
critical component of income support when unemployed. As a result, 
the arguments for continued exclusion of these workers from the sys 
tem should be seriously examined.
Justifications for the continued exclusion of agricultural and house 
hold workers, in particular, revolve primarily around practical consid 
erations and cost and do not rest on more philosophical grounds. In 
light of the program's history of demonstrating that many expected 
administrative burdens related to coverage could actually be managed 
quite effectively, strict scrutiny should be given to the validity of prac 
tical arguments against the coverage of excluded groups.
For all groups of excluded wage and salaried workers, financial con 
siderations—such as concerns about the additional benefit costs from 
including currently uncovered workers—should be weighed against 
the significant benefits that would accrue by covering those workers. In 
addition, efforts should be made to minimize the effects on the UI sys 
tem that result from the ambiguous external system for classifying 
employees. Finally, additional attention should be paid to the system of
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optional, reimbursable UI coverage offered to self-employed individu 
als in California, in order to determine the feasibility of extending cov 
erage on a similarly limited basis to self-employed individuals.
Recipiency
Measurement
Two statistics have primarily been used to measure recipiency. The 
first is the ratio of the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) to the Total 
Unemployment Rate (TUR),9 and the second is the ratio of UI claim 
ants (IU) to the total number of unemployed (TU). 10 The two ratios are 
highly correlated (figure 2.2). The IUR/TUR is more difficult to inter 
pret than the IU/TU because of various mathematical complications 
related to the definitions of the populations being counted. Neverthe 
less, the IUR/TUR ratio is widely reported, and the IUR itself is of par 
ticular importance because it represents the primary trigger for the 
federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) program. Both ratios are based on 
a measure of the number of UI claimants, collected by state on a 
weekly basis.
The total number of claimants, however, includes some individuals 
who do not receive UI benefits but are counted among the insured 
unemployed for any given week. Three primary groups of individuals 
fall into this category: (1) individuals who are on a one-week waiting 
period before the beginning of their benefit spell; (2) claimants who are 
ultimately denied benefits for nonmonetary reasons; and (3) claimants 
who are disqualified from collecting benefits in a given week for rea 
sons that include the requirement that recipients be able and available 
for work and that claimants who are working not exceed a given level 
of income in a week. The inclusion of these groups has tended to 
inflate the measure of UI recipiency by 10 to 15 percent per year (fig 
ure 2.3). Thus, a third, less frequently used, measure of recipiency is 
the number of actual weeks compensated, which excludes claimants 
who do not receive benefits in any given week, as a percentage of total 
unemployment.
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All three measures are correlated with one another, and because of 
their varied use, all are cited at some point in this chapter when consid 
ering research regarding recipiency. The IU/TU measure is encoun 
tered most frequently in the research literature; thus, it is this measure 
to which reference is most frequently made in the discussion contained 
in this chapter.
Trends in Recipiency
Using any of the three measures discussed above, the percentage of 
unemployed workers who receive UI benefits under regular state pro 
grams has exhibited two significant trends: (1) a long-term trend, in 
which the national recipiency percentage has declined slowly and con 
sistently since the 1940s; and (2) a more recent trend, in which the 
recipiency percentage dipped dramatically between 1980 and 1984 and 
has remained near that low rate throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
Recipiency measures vary considerably across states, with 1993 
ratios of claimants to total unemployed ranging from a low of 15 per 
cent in South Dakota to a high of 64 percent in Alaska (see table 2.1). 
Over time, most state rankings (relative to other states) on recipiency 
have fluctuated significantly. That is, most states have had relatively 
higher recipiency rates in some years and relatively lower rates in other 
years. (It is likely that much of this fluctuation is a result of variations 
over time in state economic conditions.) Among those states that have 
especially high or especially low recipiency rates, however, there is 
less variation in their rankings relative to other states. For example, 
since annual state recipiency data first became available in 1976, nei 
ther of the two states with the lowest average rank—Virginia and 
Texas—has ever ranked higher than 43rd among the fifty states. Simi 
larly, neither of the two states with the highest average rank—Alaska 
and Rhode Island—has ever ranked lower than 7th among the fifty 
states.
In the long term, the IU/TU ratio has declined by approximately 40 
percent since 1947, the first year for which data are available. The ratio 
has consistently displayed (1) an overall downward trend and (2) some 
cyclical variation during periods of recession, as job losers—who are 
more likely to be eligible for benefits—represent a higher percentage 
of the unemployed during these periods, when layoffs tend to increase.
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship between the IU/TU and the 
unemployment rate over time. The overall downward trend suggests 
that the UI program has served an ever-decreasing percentage of the 
unemployed.
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The long-term decline in UI recipiency was combined with a pro 
nounced drop in both measures of recipiency during the early 1980s. 
By 1984, the number of UI claimants as a percentage of total unem 
ployment had dropped to 28.5 percent, the lowest recorded percentage 
since data were first collected in 1947. The ratio increased slightly after 
1984 but has remained lower than its historical average.
The period since 1980 is also the first one during which recipiency 
measures did not increase significantly as the unemployment rate 
peaked. 11 This represents a fundamental shift away from the dynamic 
trends that had marked the UI program since its inception. 12 Burtless 
and Saks (1984) also find a fundamental shift in dynamics, in that the 
extremely strong statistical relationship that had existed between 
insured unemployment and the number of job losers unemployed for 
less than 26 weeks deteriorated significantly in the early 1980s.
Research on Trends in Recipiency
The long-term and recent declines likely were caused by a combina 
tion of factors that tend to have similar effects upon the UI system. To 
date, the long-term trend has generated relatively little research inter 
est. The research that does exist, such as that by Burtless and Saks 
(1984), suggests that the long-term decline is partially a result of broad 
shifts in the demographics of the labor market, coupled with industrial 
shifts. To the extent that the percentage of the unemployed receiving 
UI benefits has decreased over the long-term, the UI program has 
become unresponsive to the needs of a growing portion of the unem 
ployed population.
A number of researchers have worked to identify the causes of the 
recent decline in national UI recipiency. The federal government began 
to support research efforts on this and related issues in the early 1980s, 
and lingering questions about the primary causes of the decline have 
fueled continuing research efforts since that time. In addition, two sets 
of supplemental questions to the Current Population Survey were 
funded that address the reasons why unemployed individuals do not 
receive benefits.
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Causes of Long-Term Decline in Recipiency
Research suggests that the long-term decline in UI recipiency is pri 
marily a result of broad changes in the demographics of the labor force 
and in industrial composition. In addition, it is likely that evolution in 
state policies has also contributed to the secular decline in the recipi 
ency rate (see chapter 15 of this volume, as well as Blaustein 1993).
Burtless and Saks (1984) suggest that a primary cause of the decline 
in the IU/TU ratio before 1980 was the changing demographic compo 
sition of the jobless. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as many women 
and young workers from the baby boom generation entered the labor 
force, they also became a higher percentage of the unemployed. As a 
result, men of prime working age, who are the most likely to receive UI 
benefits, declined considerably as a percentage of the unemployed. 
Burtless and Saks find that such demographic changes explain a large 
percentage of the decline in the IU/TU ratio before 1980.
While the demographic changes described by Burtless and Saks 
declined in their impact after 1980, other demographic changes have 
continued or even accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps the 
most significant change is the continuing rise in the number of two- 
earner families. It is likely that the increase in two-earner households 
has reduced the need of some workers to apply for UI benefits upon 
becoming unemployed. Thus, it is possible that various broad demo 
graphic changes have continued to have a negative impact upon UI 
recipiency. Factors that affect current receipt of benefits are discussed 
in a later section.
The shift of workers from manufacturing and other industries with 
high UI recipiency rates was also identified by Burtless and Saks as a 
primary cause of the long-term decrease in recipiency, although they 
report that it is quite difficult to estimate with precision the magnitude 
of this effect. As will be discussed, the downtrend in manufacturing 
also has been identified as a significant cause of the recipiency decline 
during the 1980s.
Causes of the Recent Decline in Recipiency
Considerable inconsistency exists in the research examining the 
decline in UI recipiency that occurred in the early 1980s. The variabil-
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ity of the results is an indication of the difficulty that researchers have 
had in quantifying the impacts of various agents. Four primary factors 
have emerged as the most common explanations of the short-term 
decline in recipiency: (1) federal and state policy changes, (2) popula 
tion shifts to states with traditionally low UI claims rates, (3) the 
decline in the unionized percentage of the work force, and (4) the 
decline in the manufacturing sector of the economy. It is likely that a 
combination of some or all of these elements contributed significantly 
to the short-term decline.
During the 1980s, several changes in federal and state law appear to 
have contributed to the reduction in the percentage of the unemployed 
who received unemployment benefits. Overall, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO 1993) finds that policies designed to improve 
the solvency of state trust funds had the effect of reducing UI recipi 
ency among unemployed individuals. Most significantly, numerous 
state laws were changed to restrict eligibility and to reduce benefit lev 
els. In part, these state laws were in response to federal policies that 
provided incentives to states to adopt more restrictive legislation for 
regular state unemployment programs. A number of federal laws, most 
notably the decision to tax UI benefits, also directly reduced the value 
of unemployment benefit levels.
Federal Policy Changes. During the 1980s, a number of significant 
changes were made in federal law governing state UI trust funds. 
Beginning in 1982, states were required to repay federal loans to their 
trust funds with interest (previously, the loans had been interest-free, 
and there was some uncertainty whether repayment would be required 
at all), and states with loans were induced to adopt other specific mea 
sures to ensure solvency. Overall, these changes provided incentives to 
states to avoid the need for future loans by reducing the scope of state 
benefit programs. In addition, states were given other direct incentives, 
linked to federal EB funds, to tighten UI eligibility requirements and to 
reduce UI benefits. Taken as a whole, these federal policy changes 
were reflected to some extent in state policy changes.
Federal laws also were changed in ways that directly and indirectly 
affected the recipiency rate. In 1979, UI benefits were partially taxed 
for the first time, and in 1986, all unemployment benefits became sub 
ject to taxation. This change reduced the effective value of applying for
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benefits and would therefore be expected to decrease the number of 
people who choose to apply for benefits. States also were required to 
reduce or eliminate UI payments to unemployed workers receiving 
pensions or social security payments. Corson and Nicholson (1988) 
find that, overall, between 11 percent and 23 percent of the total 
decline can be directly attributed to various federal policy changes. 
Specifically, between 11 and 16 percent is due to partial taxation of 
benefits and up to 7 percent to less generous EB programs.
State Policy Changes. During the 1980s, many states adopted tighter 
monetary eligibility standards or stricter disqualification provisions for 
their regular UI programs. GAO (1993) reports that forty-four states 
tightened their standards in one or both of these regards between 1981 
and 1987. Further, the increase in a state's minimum earnings require 
ments was nearly five times greater among the twenty states with the 
lowest levels of trust funds than among all of the remaining states. 
States have also tightened other aspects of eligibility, as they increas 
ingly disqualify individuals for misconduct or for refusal of suitable 
work. It is likely that many of these state changes came about in 
response to the federal incentives to tighten eligibility, although it is 
impossible to determine the precise impact that changes in federal leg 
islation alone had on the policy decisions of states.
Some research has found that these and other changes in state policy 
account for a significant percentage of the decline in recipiency. Cor 
son and Nicholson (1988) find that 21 to 54 percent of the decline in 
recipiency between 1980 and 1986 is attributable to state policy 
changes. Specifically, the decline is due to the following: 9 to 11 per 
cent to increases in denial rates for disqualifying income, 3 to 11 per 
cent to increases in the minimum earnings required to qualify for UI, 2 
to 11 percent to increases in the denial rate for misconduct, up to 13 
percent to changes in voluntary separation standards, 5 percent to 
reductions in maximum duration of benefits, and 2 to 4 percent to 
changes in wage replacement rates. 13 In addition, they find that the IU/ 
TU ratio would have increased between 1 percent and 13 percent as a 
result of reductions in work test denials, thereby partially canceling the 
effects of the other factors. Burtless and Saks (1984) also conclude that 
state legislative and administrative changes are the primary cause of 
the decline in recipiency, but they do not present estimates of the mag 
nitude of the effects of these changes.
Unemployment Insurance in the United States 71
Baldwin and McHugh (1992) suggest that state policy changes 
account for 54 percent of the decline in recipiency rates between 1979 
and 1990. 14 They suggest that the decline can be attributed to the fol 
lowing: 21 percent to increases in the minimum earnings required to 
qualify for UI, 16 percent to increases in the earnings required to qual 
ify for the maximum benefit, 8 percent to increases in the number of 
states with disqualification periods for job quitters, 7 percent to 
increases in the number of states with disqualification periods for 
refusal of suitable work, and 1 percent to increases in the number of 
states with right-to-work laws. 15 An updated work, however, found 
sharp reductions in the apparent effects of state policy changes (Bald 
win 1993).
Blank and Card (1991) find little evidence that state policy changes 
had any impact on recipiency. They do find that individual eligibility 
for UI benefits appeared to decrease slightly as a result of tighter state 
eligibility standards, although these effects were offset by increasing 
wage levels. They suggest, however, that application rates among the 
eligible appeared to fall in the early 1980s, accounting for some of the 
decline in recipiency.
Population Shifts. An increasing share of U.S. unemployment is 
located in southern and mountain states, where the IU/TU ratio consis 
tently has been lower than the national average. Thus, as the percent 
age of national unemployment located in these states increases, the 
national IU/TU ratio would be expected to fall accordingly. This is a 
long-term demographic trend, occurring throughout the last three 
decades and continuing into the present. Blank and Card (1991) find 
that these regional shifts in population accounted for approximately 50 
percent of the decline in the national IU/TU ratio between 1977 and 
1987. Vroman (1991) suggests that these shifts may have accounted for 
25 percent of that decline, and Corson and Nicholson (1988) attribute 
16 percent of the change to geographic population shifts.
Decline in Unionization. The proportion of workers who are mem 
bers of unions has fallen significantly since the 1950s. Between 1979 
and 1988, the unionization percentage declined from 23.8 percent of 
the labor force to 18.8 percent (Curme et al. 1990 and Kokkelenberg 
and Sockell 1985). Because unions have traditionally represented a 
powerful source of information regarding available benefits for unem 
ployed workers, it is possible that the decrease in union membership
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exacerbated any existing information problem among the unemployed. 
In addition, unions have often facilitated the filing of members' UI 
claims by helping to guide them through the UI system. Finally, the 
members of many unions are only eligible for supplemental unemploy 
ment benefits paid by their union if they apply for regular UI.
Blank and Card (1991) attribute 25 percent of the decline in recipi 
ency to the decrease in unionization. Baldwin and McHugh (1992) 
assign 29 percent of the reduction in recipiency to the decline in union 
ization. Vroman (1991) also points to the potential importance of the 
unions' information role by noting that the most important reason for 
nonapplication for UI benefits by unemployed individuals is their 
belief that they are ineligible for UI. If individuals' understanding of 
eligibility is incorrect, then eligible workers may not be applying 
because they believe they are ineligible. 16
Decline in Manufacturing. As noted, Burtless and Saks (1984) sug 
gest that industrial shifts contributed to the long-term decrease in 
recipiency. This trend continued in the 1980s, as manufacturing as a 
percentage of total employment fell by 22 percent between 1979 and 
1990. This factor has also been identified as a significant cause of the 
short-term decline. Corson and Nicholson (1988) find that between 4 
percent and 18 percent of the decrease in the UI claims ratio can be 
attributed to the decline in the manufacturing sector, while Baldwin 
and McHugh (1992) attribute 16 percent of the total decline in the IU/ 
TU ratio to this factor. In addition, Corson and Nicholson (1988) 
observe that an unemployed worker previously employed in manufac 
turing is 25 percent more likely to collect UI than a similar worker 
from another industry. It should be noted that analyses by Corson and 
Rangarajan (1994), and Baldwin (1993) both unexpectedly find that a 
decrease in manufacturing employment actually leads to an increase in 
thelUR. 17
Overall, the decline in manufacturing is closely linked to the decline 
in unionization, because unions traditionally have been composed dis 
proportionately of workers in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the 
effects of these factors may be difficult to separate.
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Who Receives UI Today: Analysis from the
In an analysis of the characteristics of all unemployed individuals 
who were not receiving benefits, the Congressional Research Service 
(1990) found that such individuals were typically young, did not head 
families, and were not the primary source of income within their fami 
lies. Generally, they had lower-than-average incomes both before and 
after their unemployment spell. As expected, the study also found that, 
as attachment to the labor market decreases, the likelihood of receiving 
UI benefits also falls. Even among those individuals who had been 
employed full-time for an entire year before the beginning of their 
unemployment spell, only 42 percent received benefits.
An additional analysis of the attributes of the unemployed who do 
receive UI benefits at some point during their unemployment spell is 
reported in table 2.2. These figures are based on an analysis of the Sur 
vey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and cover unemploy 
ment spells that occurred between 1989 and 1991. 19
It should be recalled that there are a number of reasons that unem 
ployed individuals may not receive UI benefits. These factors fall into 
five general categories. First, the job may not be covered under the UI 
system. (This is most likely to affect agricultural workers on small 
farms or self-employed individuals.) Second, the person may not sat 
isfy the monetary eligibility requirements for the program. Third, the 
individual may not satisfy the nonmonetary eligibility requirements. 
Fourth, some unemployed workers may satisfy both sets of eligibility 
requirements and choose not to apply for benefits. Finally, some job 
less persons who satisfy eligibility requirements may not realize that 
they are eligible for benefits.
Effects of Demographic and Economic Factors on Recipiency
The results in table 2.2 provide some evidence that demographic and 
economic factors have been responsible for at least part of the decline 
in recipiency, generally supporting conclusions reached by a number of 
earlier researchers.20 Specifically, the SIPP analysis found that if indi 
viduals earn relatively high wages, work in the manufacturing sector, 
work full time for the entire year, are a member of a union, live in the 
Northeast, or are job losers (rather than job leavers) they will be more 
likely to receive UI benefits when unemployed. 21













































































































































































SOURCE: Bassi and Chasanov (1996) analysis using the SIPP research file The total sample size used vaned by worker characteristic 5,283 for the wage 
rate data; 8,619 for the poverty status data, 6,260 for the occupation/industry data, 6,287 for the hours of work data; 6,504 for the union status data, 8,221 
for the metropolitan status data; 8,619 for region of the country data; and 4,167 for the reason for unemployment
NOTE: "na" indicates that an estimate cannot be provided due to small sample sizes. Due to missing data, less than half of the sample was used for the fol 
lowing demographic groupings: wage rate, occupation/industry, hours of work, union status, and reason for unemployment.
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Thus, as the percentage of the workforce that is in possession of 
these attributes has decreased, the percentage of the unemployed work 
force that receives UI benefits has declined. Further, since many of 
these attributes are more likely to describe men than women, they also 
help to explain why unemployed men are more likely to receive UI 
benefits than are unemployed women. For similar reasons, whites are 
more likely to receive benefits than are blacks.
General Effects of State Monetary Eligibility Standards
Table 2.3 summarizes the results from simulations of monetary eli 
gibility among SIPP participants. 22 Overall, 56 percent of the unem 
ployed satisfy their state monetary eligibility requirements; this ranges 
from a little more than one-third of black females to approximately 
two-thirds of unemployed white males. As expected, monetary eligibil 
ity rises with wages and with attachment to the labor force.
The majority of the unemployed who do not meet their state mone 
tary eligibility requirements are either new entrants to the labor force, 
reentrants to the labor force, or individuals with sporadic labor force 
attachment. 23 Of the unemployed who do not meet their state monetary 
eligibility requirements, 64 percent do not satisfy the requirement of 
their state that they have earnings in at least two of the four quarters in 
the base period. 24 Of the monetarily ineligible individuals who do ful 
fill the two-quarter requirement, 23 percent fail to meet the base-period 
earnings standard. The remaining 13 percent (who meet the other two 
requirements) fail to meet the high-quarter earnings requirement (table 
2.4).
In all likelihood, any liberalization of states UI eligibility rules 
would not affect the majority of the unemployed who do not currently 
meet the two-quarter earnings requirement (since UI was never 
intended to provide assistance to new entrants and reentrants to the 
labor force). It is likely, however, that at least some of the unemployed 
who meet the two-quarter earnings requirement but fail to satisfy the 
base period or high quarter earnings requirements would be affected by 
changes in state earnings standards.
Combining the results of tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicates that the group 
of those who have worked for at least two quarters but still fail to meet 
their state monetary eligibility requirements includes 18 percent of all 
unemployed white women, 13 percent of all unemployed black
Table 2.3 Percentage of Unemployed Workers Who Meet the UI Monetary Eligibility Requirements in Their State, 























































































































SOURCE: Bassi and Chasanov (1996) analysis using the SIPP research file. The total sample size used vaned by worker characteristic: 5,283 for the wage 
rate data; 6,260 for the occupation/industry data; 6,287 for the hours of work data, and 8,221 for the metropolitan status data.
NOTE "na" indicates that an estimate cannot be provided due to small sample sizes Due to missing data, less than half of the overall sample was used for 
the demographic groupings above.



























SOURCE- Bassi and Chasanov (1996) analysis using the SIPP research file
NOTE. The total sample size of unemployed who were monetarily ineligible for benefits was 3,786: 2,506 failed to meet the two-quarter requirement; of 
the remaining individuals who met that requirement, 867 failed to meet the base-period requirement, and of the remaining individuals who met those two 
requirements, 413 failed to meet the high-quarter requirement or similar requirements. Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding
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women, 15 percent of all unemployed white men, and 11 percent of all 
unemployed black men. Additional tabulations (not included in this 
chapter) indicate that, in comparison with other unemployed persons, 
the individuals in this category earn extremely low wages and have 
very high poverty rates prior to the onset of unemployment.
Determinants of Receipt among the Monetarily Eligible
It should be recalled that, in addition to monetary requirements, 
unemployed individuals must satisfy a variety of nonmonetary require 
ments in order to qualify for and maintain ongoing eligibility for UI 
benefits. No currently available data base enables distinctions to be 
made among the unemployed who satisfy these nonmonetary require 
ments and those who do not. The SIPP does provide information on 
one important related factor: whether an unemployed individual lost 
the previous job or quit the job. The vast majority of those who quit 
their jobs are ultimately ineligible for UI benefits. Tabulations from the 
SIPP indicate that, among the unemployed who meet monetary eligi 
bility requirements, 58 percent of those who lost their jobs receive UI 
benefits, while only 14 percent of those who quit receive benefits.
Some of those who have lost their jobs and who do not receive UI 
benefits may have been fired for cause and, therefore, may be ineligible 
for UI. Others may fail to meet some other aspect of continuing non- 
monetary eligibility. Some may not be aware that they are eligible for 
benefits. Still others may choose not to apply for benefits for some rea 
son—perhaps they expect to be unemployed for only a short period of 
time, or perhaps they have adequate income from other sources (e.g., a 
working spouse) and do not go to the trouble of applying for benefits.
Recipiency Policy Issues
The decline in recipiency has raised considerable concern because it 
affects the two primary functions of the UI system. First, it reduces the 
capacity of the system to provide adequate insurance to workers who 
face the risk of involuntary unemployment. Fewer workers receiving 
benefits reduces the insurance value of the system. Second, the sys 
tem's capacity to stabilize the macroeconomy through the automatic 
countercyclical injection of funds into the economy is compromised. 
This is affected by recipiency in two ways. First, as the percentage of
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unemployed workers who receive benefits decreases, fewer benefits are 
paid during recessions. Second, the IUR is the primary mechanism 
through which the EB program is activated during recessions. Because 
recipiency is reflected in this measure, the decline in recipiency has 
reduced the likelihood that extended benefits will trigger on during a 
recession, thereby reducing its capacity to stabilize the economy dur 
ing downturns.
Thus, the very effectiveness of the system is, in part, a direct func 
tion of the percentage of the unemployed whom it serves. It appears 
that the recipiency decline is a result of a combination of factors. To the 
extent that the decline resulted from personal decisions by unemployed 
individuals not to apply for benefits, there is somewhat less cause for 
concern: the program has still met the first goal for those people, but 
they have elected not to take advantage of it. In that case, only the sec 
ond goal is endangered. However, to the extent that the decline has 
resulted either from policy changes directly or from public policies that 
have not been adjusted to address relevant external developments (e.g., 
demographic and economic changes, declines in unionization) there is 
indeed cause for concern, for the program's capacity to achieve both 
goals will have been compromised.
The discussion in this chapter suggests that the second scenario is 
supported by much of the research literature. There are a number of 
steps that can be taken that may help to reverse this trend and to 
increase the number of recipients among involuntarily unemployed 
individuals with a substantial attachment to the labor force. Perhaps 
most important among these is to encourage states to determine mone 
tary eligibility by using hours of work—rather than earnings—as a 
measure of attachment to the labor force. Doing so would end the cur 
rent situation, in which low-wage workers must work more hours than 
high-wage workers in order to qualify for UI. This change could affect 
the eligibility of up to 15 percent of all unemployed workers. These are 
primarily low-wage workers who meet the requirement of having earn 
ings in two quarters but do not have a sufficient level of earnings to 
meet either the base-period or high-quarter earnings requirements.
This potential increase in eligibility resulting from a change to an 
hours-of-work requirement would be partially offset by a decrease in 
the number of high-wage workers with low labor force attachment who 
are eligible. Alternatively, states could simply set their earnings
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requirements low enough to ensure that minimum wage workers with a 
substantial labor force attachment are able to qualify (this would not 
affect high-wage workers with low labor force attachment). In 1995, 
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation recommended 
changes in state standards that would allow all workers with at least 
800 hours of work in a base period to meet state monetary eligibility 
requirements.25
There are also a number of steps that could be taken to decrease the 
rate of nonfiling by unemployed individuals. Improving the informa 
tion that unemployed workers have about the eligibility requirements 
of the program could enhance filing, and might offset the portion of the 
decline in recipiency that has been caused by the slippage in unioniza 
tion. Changes in certain federal policy incentives, including a reduction 
in the taxation of UI benefits, could also have the effect of decreasing 
nonfiling.
The above changes could have a positive effect on the recipiency 
rate by directly affecting UI policies. At the same time, however, it is 
possible that these changes could be offset by more fundamental, struc 
tural elements of the system, which also may explain some of the 
decline in UI recipiency. For example, because states finance the vast 
majority of UI benefits through a tax on employers, any interstate com 
petition to attract businesses could serve to reduce UI tax rates (as well 
as any other corporate taxes that are set by the states) to a level lower 
than would prevail in the absence of competition. Because it is clear 
that, in the long run, the relationship between solvency and benefits is a 
direct one, then decreases in taxes would necessitate decreases on the 
benefit side as well, all else being equal.
Although a number of studies have found that UI taxes do not play a 
significant role in business location decisions, all that is required for 
competition to develop is a perception by some states that UI taxes do 
affect such decisions. There is evidence that this perception does exist 
in many states. One recent study found that almost half of all states cite 
low UI tax rates in their economic development literature as a positive 
reason to relocate to that state. The study also found empirical evi 
dence that states do compete in setting UI tax rates, and that this com 
petition has had the effect of reducing average tax rates (Bassi and 
McMurrer 1996). This finding supports economic analysis suggesting 
that interstate economic competition would result in "inefficiently low
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levels of UI benefits [being] provided" (Hoyt 1996, MM-10). Thus, if 
interstate competition were present in the UI system, it would likely 
result in an ongoing decline in the relevance of the system, potentially 
undermining other direct policy efforts to increase the percentage of 
the involuntarily unemployed who receive benefits.
Conclusions
All else being equal, the extensions of UI coverage to new groups of 
workers should have raised the percentage of unemployed workers 
who receive UI benefits. However, as coverage has expanded since 
1954, the percentage of the unemployed that actually receives benefits 
has declined. The simultaneous occurrence of these trends in coverage 
and recipiency represents cause for concern. It suggests that the overall 
UI system, even as it directly changes by covering a larger percentage 
of workers, has not been adjusted to respond to the evolving realities of 
the work force.
The combined effect of the two trends also suggests that one form of 
equity within the system has been eroded, as employer taxes that are 
paid on the wages of an increasing percentage of the labor force have 
gone to finance benefits for a decreasing share of the unemployed pop 
ulation. Stated somewhat differently, costs of the system are currently 
spread across a larger number of employers, while the percentage of 
workers who actually receive benefits has decreased. This effect 
increases to the extent that employers can pass UI payroll taxes on to 
workers in the form of lower wages, and the effect is greater in states 
that have low taxable wage bases, where low-wage workers necessarily 
pay a disproportionate share of the taxes that are passed on by employ 
ers. 26 Overall, it is clear that the real benefits accruing from the increase 
in the percentage of the labor force covered under the system have 
been rendered significantly less important as they have been offset by a 
substantial decline in the capacity of the UI system to be a presence in 
the lives of involuntarily unemployed individuals.
Editors' Note. As this book goes to press, recent research on some issues addressed in this chap 
ter has become available On the issue of interstate competition in UI tax policy, Wayne Vroman 
finds no persuasive evidence that such competition has occurred Similarly, Vroman finds no evi-
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dence that states have implemented policies intended to shift costs of income maintenance from 
the UI program to welfare programs. (See Wayne Vroman (forthcoming), "An Analysis of Inter 
state Competition in the Unemployment Insurance Program," UI Occasional Paper, Unemploy 
ment Insurance Service, Employment and Training Administration, Washington: U S. Department 
of Labor, and Wayne Vroman (1997), "Unemployment Insurance, Welfare and Federal-State 
Interrelations- Final Report," UI Occasional Paper 97-2, Unemployment Insurance Service, 
Employment and Training Administration, Washington- U.S. Department of Labor.)
NOTES
Much of the research in this chapter is based on analyses that the authors have conducted as 
staff members of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation. Additional information 
in some areas can be found in the three annual reports of the Advisory Council The views 
expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the 
members or the staff of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
1 Many states, however, chose to employ more liberal coverage standards from the beginning, 
particularly on requirements regarding the size of firm. The existence of more liberal coverage 
standards in various states has continued throughout the history of the program
2. This provision did not apply to employees of churches or other religious organizations 
Nonprofit employers were offered the choice of either reimbursing the state for only those benefits 
chargeable to them or paying the state UI tax in the same manner as other covered employers. 
Nonprofit employers were also offered the option of forming a group to pool their benefit liabili 
ties through a common reserve fund. All nonprofit organizations remained exempt from the fed 
eral unemployment tax.
3. The reimbursement option was made available to all state and local government employers, 
and such employers remained exempt from the federal unemployment tax.
4 Estimates suggested that at least 50 percent of agricultural workers would be included as a 
result of this change
5. Costs for both groups are financed entirely by the federal government out of general reve 
nues.
6 See testimony from various agricultural groups at Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation hearing, New York City, September 8-9, 1994
7. This figure represents the estimate of the additional cost of extending agricultural coverage 
to all farm workers in those states that have not yet extended coverage It was derived by extrapo 
lating the experience and negative agricultural balances in the State of California.
8 There has been no evaluation of the effect of this programs, and there are no statistics avail 
able on the extent to which it has been used
9 The IUR is defined as the number of regular UI benefit claimants divided by the average 
number of people in Ul-covered employment over four of the last six completed calendar quar 
ters The TUR is defined as the number of all active unemployed job seekers divided by the total 
civilian labor force
10. The specific measure of recipiency used by researchers in examining this question has var 
ied. Corson and Nicholson (1988) examined both ratios but focused upon the IU/TU, which they 
call the UI claims ratio. Blank and Card (1991) also examined this measure, which they call the 
fraction of insured unemployment Vroman (1991) focused upon the IU/TU ratio as well. Baldwin 
and McHugh (1992) examine IU/TU, but they include EB recipients in addition to regular state UI 
recipients
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11 It is likely that part of this change in dynamics can be attributed to the unusual back-to- 
back recessions during the 1980-1983 period Some recipients who exhausted benefits during the 
first recession were likely to have been ineligible for benefits during the second recession, thereby 
limiting the increase in recipiency during the second recession.
12. The IUR/TUR and IU/TU ratios can be statistically predicted quite accurately for the years 
up to 1980 by knowing only two variables (1) the year (a reflection of the long-term decline of 
the system) and (2) the unemployment rate (because of the tendency for the ratio to increase sig 
nificantly during periods of high unemployment) Since 1980, however, the recipiency ratios no 
longer consistently demonstrate the same statistical relationship to these two variables
13 Any apparent discrepancy in totals is due to roundmg error.
14 Baldwin and McHugh's findings (1992) have been reformulated in the text in order to 
facilitate greater comparability between these results and those of other studies. In particular, 
Baldwin and McHugh report that state policy changes account for 97 4 percent (rather than 54 
percent) of the total net change in the IU/TU ratio Overall, they find three primary factors that 
decreased the IU/TU ratio, along with other factors that partially offset the decrease Thus, when 
only the three factors that decrease the ratio are combined, they are larger than the net decline. As 
a result, each of the factors independently appears to be a large percentage of the net decrease. In 
order to determine the relative impact of each factor, the percentage of the overall negative impact 
upon the IU/TU ratio that is attributable to each of those factors must be calculated These calcu 
lations indicate that state policy changes account for 54 percent of the decline in IU/TU, 
decreased unionization for 29 percent, and decreases in the manufacturing sector for 16 percent 
The remaining 1 percent is attributable to the lagged unemployment level
15. Any apparent discrepancy in totals is due to roundmg error
16. A recent supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) will allow this question to be 
answered more definitively, but the results will not be available for some time.
17. Corson and Rangarajan (1994) emphasize that this result is unexpected and suggest that it 
should be viewed with caution.
18 The analysis reported in this section draws heavily on work by Bassi and Chasanov 
(1996) While data limitations make it impossible to distinguish among many of these reasons for 
nonreceipt of UI benefits among the unemployed, the Survey of Income and Program Participa 
tion (SIPP) is arguably the best available information for these purposes Using the CPS, Blank 
and Card estimate that between 1977 and 1987, only 43 percent of the unemployed met their 
state's eligibility requirements. Their estimate is, however, very rough because the absence of ret 
rospective earnings data in the CPS introduces error into the eligibility simulations (which require 
quarterly earnings data for 18 months prior to unemployment). Two special CPS supplements 
(1989-90 and 1993) do, however, include information on why unemployed individuals do not 
receive UI benefits. Consequently, the CPS can be used to analyze somewhat different issues than 
can be analyzed with the SIPP. Vroman (1991) is an example of this approach The SIPP is prefer 
able for two main reasons (1) it contains longitudinal, quarterly earnings data, which are neces 
sary for simulating UI monetary eligibility, and (2) the most recently available cohorts of the SIPP 
include information on whether individuals quit or lost their jobs Individual monetary eligibility 
can be estimated for each individual in the SIPP by applying simulation models of UI eligibility to 
the SIPP data.
19. In interpreting this table and those that follow, it should be noted that some variables in the 
SIPP (e.g , hourly wage rate and union status) are frequently missing Consequently, only a subset 
of the SIPP sample is available for cross-tabulating UI receipt by these variables As a result, the 
disaggregated UI receipt rates may be substantially different from the overall receipt rate
Further, the levels of UI receipt reported in the SIPP (like most other relevant data bases that 
are not based on administrative data) tend to be several percentage points below the officially
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reported levels. There are several possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, the officially 
reported statistics include individuals who have filed for benefits, although some of these individ 
uals are not actually receiving benefits Second, it is likely that receipt of benefits is frequently 
underreported by respondents to the SIPP (and other major surveys) Third, the officially reported 
statistics on UI receipt implicitly weight unemployment spells by their duration, whereas the data 
in table 22 are based on spells of unemployment and do not make any durational adjustment 
Since individuals experiencing short spells of unemployment are less likely to apply for UI, this 
conceptual difference in the two measurements undoubtedly accounts for some portion of the dis 
crepancy.
20 See, for example, Baldwin and McHugh (1992), Blank and Card (1991), Burtless and Saks 
(1984), and Broman (1991).
21 Individuals who had no earnings during the base period (i e , new entrants or reentrants to 
the labor force) were excluded from the analysis
22 These estimates understate monetary eligibility to the extent that individuals have underre 
ported their income in the IPP. According to the simulations, approximately 3 percent of the 
unemployed who are calculated to be ineligible for UI report that they do, in fact, receive UI ben 
efits. Thus, either the simulations are incorrect because of underreported income, or these individ 
uals are receiving UI benefits in error Undoubtedly, some additional individuals who are 
simulated to be ineligible do, in fact, meet the monetary eligibility rules in their states but do not 
receive benefits.
An additional source of error results from using the state in which an individual resides as the 
basis for the simulations. To be accurate, the simulations should be based on the state in which an 
individual works (although this information is not available in the SIPP) Unlike underrreporting 
of income, however, this latter source of mismeasurement is unlikely to cause any systematic bias 
in these estimates of eligibility.
23. A small percentage of these individuals may have a long-term continuous labor force 
attachment but may fail to meet the two-quarter earnings requirements because of two or more 
spells of unemployment within a short period of time
24 It should be noted that not all states use all three of the general monetary requirements dis 
cussed in this paragraph. The individuals who are reported as being ineligible by each of the 
requirements are only those whose state has such a provision in its law. Thus, individuals who 
worked only one quarter, but whose states do not require earnings in at least two quarters, are not 
included in the groups of workers who are identified as having been disqualified for failing to 
meet that requirement.
25. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation made other recommendations 
related to nonmonetary eligibility, including the elimination of exclusions of seasonal workers 
from UI eligibility in some states, and the elimination of requirements in some states that workers 
seek full-time employment
26 For evidence on the extent to which employer UI taxes are shifted to workers, see, for 
example, Anderson and Meyer (1994)
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